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The Space Transportation Operations (STO) safety policy is to minimize STO
involvement in the payload and its GSE (ground support equipment) design
process while maintaining the assurance of a safe operation. Requirements
for assuring payload mission success are the responsibility of the payload
organization and are beyond the scope of this document. The intent is to
provide the overall safety policies and requirements while allowing for
negotiation between the payload organization and the STO operator in the
method of implementation of payload safety.
This revision provides for a relaxation in the monitoring requirements for
inhibits, allows the payload organization to pursue new design options and
reflects, additionally, same new requirements. As of the issue date of this
NHB, payloads which have completed the formal safety assessment reviews of
their preliminary design on the basis of the May 1979 issue will be reassessed
for compliance with the above changes. Such payloads are requested to review
their design and operations and submit updated safety analyses within 60 days.
All other payloads must comply with this NHB in its entirety.
John F. Yardley
Associate Administrator for
Space Transportation Systems
Stanley I. Weiss
Associate administrator for
Space Transportation Operations
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL
100 PURPOSE. This document establishes the policy and safety requirements
applicable to all STS payloads and their GSE.
101 SCOPE. These requirements are intended to protect flight and ground per-
sonnel, the STS, other payloads, GSE, the general public, public-private
property, and the environment from payload-related hazards. This document
contains technical and system safety requirements applicable to STS payloads
(including payload-provided ground and flight support systems) during ground
and flight operations. For additional safety requirements which are unique
to ground operations and GSE design, see the KSC Launch Site Accommodations
Handbook for STS Payloads, K-STSM-14.1. In the event of differences between
that handbook and this document, this document shall take precedence. These
additional ground safety requirements will be deleted from the KSC handbook
and incorporated as an appendix to this document at a subsequent revision.
102 RESPONSIBILITY.
1. Payload Organization. It is the responsibility of each payload organi-
zation to assure the safety of its payload and to implement the require-
ments of this document. Where a payload integration or mission manage-
ment organization is identified, that organization interfaces with the
STS operator on behalf of the group of individual payload elements or
experiments. That organization has the responsibility to assure that
the individual payload elements are safe and meet the requirements of
this document. That organization also has the responsibility to assure
that interaction among its payload elements does not create a hazard.
2. STS Operator. It is the responsibility of the STS operator to interface
with the responsible payload organization to review the payload for
adequate safety implementation. It is also the responsibility of the
STS operator to assure that interaction among mixed payloads and between
payloads and the STS does not create a hazard.
103 IMPLEMENTATION. This document identifies the safety policy and requirements
which are to be implemented by the payload organization. The detailed
interpretation and implementation of safety requirements will be determined
on a case-by-case basis and must be consistent with hazard potential.
Supplementary documents have been issued to assist payload organizations in
complying with the technical (chapter 2) and system safety (chapter 3)
requirements of this document.
1. Safety Guidelines Handbook. To supplement the technical requirements,
NASA has published the Space Transportation System Payload Safety Guide-
lines Handbook, JSC 11123, which suggests various methods of imple-
menting safety in design which NASA has found to be acceptable. JSC
11123 does not represent requirements imposed by NASA as there are many
alternative solutions to the control of any hazard; instead, it is
provided to assist payload organizations in their design activities.
2. Implementation Procedure. The Implementation Procedure for STS Payloads
System Safety Requirements, JSC 13830, has been published to assist the
payload organization in implementing the system safety requirements and
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further defines the safety analyses, data submittals, and safety assess-
ment review meetings. JSC 13830 identifies the respective roles of the
STS flight operator (JSC) and the STS launch/landing site operator (KSC)
and is jointly issued. JSC 13830 reflects a basic policy of common-
ality, compatibility, and coordination between the STS flight and ground
elements in the implementation effort.
1-2
CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
200 GENERAL. The following requirements are applicable to all payloads. These
requirements apply under worst-case natural and induced environments,
including STS abort and emergency landing conditions. Payloads which are
not planned for return must be compatible with the environments encountered
during STS abort and emergency landing. When a requirement cannot be met, a
waiver request must be submitted in accordance with JSC 13830.
201 FAILURE TOLERANCE. For hazardous functions, the payload must tolerate a
minimum number of credible failures and/or operator errors determined by the
hazard level. This criterion applies when the loss of a function or the
inadvertent occurrence of a function results in a hazardous event.
1. Critical Hazards. No single failure or operator error shall result in
Damage to STS equipment or in the use of contingency or emergency
procedures.
2. Catastrophic Hazards. No combination of two failures, operator errors,
orRT(radiofrequency) signals shall result in the potential for
personnel injury, loss of the Orbiter, ground facilities, or STS
equipment.
202 CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS FUNCTIONS.
1. Functions Resulting in Critical Hazards. A function that could result
in a critical hazard must be controlled by two independent inhibits,
whenever the hazard potential exists. Monitoring of these inhibits and
the requirement to return to a safe condition will be determined on a
case-by-case basis. When required, these inhibits may be monitored by
the Orbiter flight crew or the ground in near real time. For deployable
payloads, monitoring and safing of the two inhibits will not be required
when both inhibit power and control circuits for the function are con-
nected to a bus that is not energized until the payload reaches a safe
distance from the Orbiter.
2. Functions Resulting in Catastrophic Hazards. A function that could
result in a catastrophic hazard must be controlled by a minimum of three
independent inhibits, whenever the hazard potential exists. One of
these inhibits must preclude operation by RF command. Monitoring and
safing of the three inhibits which prevent the occurrence of a
catastrophic function will not be required when both the inhibit power
and control circuits are connected to a bus that is not energized until
the payload reaches a safe distance from the Orbiter. When the function
power bus or control circuits are powered before achieving a safe
distance from the Orbiter, monitoring shall be available to verify that
at least two of the three inhibits are in place. Monitoring of these
inhibits shall be available to the launch site when necessary to assure
safe ground operations. In the following paragraphs specific commmand
and monitoring requirements are defined for several identified catastro-
phic hazards. The monitoring provisions of these paragraphs do not
apply if the nonenergized bus option above is used. Final separation
from the Orbiter as used in the following paragraphs is the last
physical interface of the payload structure with the Orbiter or ASE
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(airborne support equipment). If the last physical interface is with an
Orbiter deployment device (e.g. RMS), then the specific monitoring and
safing requirements in the following paragraphs may be amended on a
case-by-case basis. Specific monitoring and safing requirements for
other catastrophic functions will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
a. Solid propel 1 ant rocket motors. The premature firing of a solid
propel 1 ant rocket motor is a~ catastrophic hazard. Payloads with
solid propellant rocket motors must coast at least 45 minutes with
a minimum separation velocity of 1 foot per second before motor
ignition (payloads not meeting this requirement must provide crew
operated RF command to inhibit motor firing until a safe distance
is assured). They shall be equipped with an S&A (safe and arm)
device that provides a mechanical interrupt in the pyrotechnic
train immediately downstream of the initiator. A minimum of two
additional inhibits shall be provided. If the function power bus
or control circuits are powered before achieving a safe distance
from the Orbiter, monitoring of the S&A device status and the
ability to return to a safe status shall be available to the flight
crew until final separation from the Orbiter. Additional require-
ments are a function of the planned payload operations as follows:
(1) S&A device not rotated to the arm position until the payload
has reached a safe distance. When the S&A device is not
rotated to the arm position until the payload has ^reached a
safe distance, the capability to monitor the status of two
additional inhibits must be available to the flight crew or
ground in near real time until final separation from the
Orbiter.
(2) S&A device rotated to the arm position prior to the payload
reaching a safe distance. When the S&A device is rotated to
the arm position prior to the payload reaching a safe
distance, at least three inhibits must remain until the pay-
load reaches a safe distance. The S&A device must remain in
the safe position during boost and entry. Rotation of the S&A
device to the arm position must be a flight crew function and
will be done only as part of the final deployment activities.
Prior to rotation of the S&A device and separation of the
payload from the Orbiter, the flight or ground crew must have
continuous real-time monitoring capability to assure that two
of the remaining inhibits are in the safe condition. If
ground monitoring is used, continuous communication must be
available to inform the flight crew of the inhibit status
until final separation from the Orbiter. The initiator must
meet the pyrotechnic requirements identified in paragraph 210.
b. Liquid propellant propulsion systems. The premature firing of a
liquid propel!ant system or adiabatic detonation prior to achieving
a safe distance is a catastrophic hazard. Each propellant delivery
system must contain a minimum of three mechanically independent
propellant flow control devices in series that remain closed during
all ground and flight phases (except ground servicing) until the
deployed payload has reached a safe distance from the Orbiter. A
2-2
flow control device shall isolate the propel 1 ant tank(s) from the
remainder of the distribution system. This isolation valve may be
opened under the provisions described in paragraph 202.2 b (2). A
minimum of one of the three devices shall be fail-safe; i.e.,
return to the closed condition in the absence of an opening signal.
The opening of any flow control device shall not result in
adianatic detonation. For liquid propellent engines of 10 pounds
or less thrust, the minimum safe firing distance following deploy-
ment is 200 feet from the Orbiter. For large engines and any
engine operable just prior to payload retrieval, the safe distance
will be determined on a case-by-case basis. For bipropellant
systems, these devices must prevent mixing or contact between the
fuel and oxidizer as well as prevent expulsion through the thrust
chamber(s). For monopropellant systems, these devices must prevent
expulsion through the thrust chamber(s). The electrical inhibits
and monitoring/safing requirements are a function of the planned
payload operations as follows:
(1) Isolation valve not opened until the payload has reached a
safe distance.When the isolation valve is not opened until
the payload has reached a safe distance from the Orbiter, the
opening of the mechanical devices shall be controlled by at
least three independent electrical inhibits that prevent
firing of the engine. Two of the three independent electrical
inhibits must be monitored by the flight or ground crew in
near real time until final separation of the payload from the
Orbiter. One of the monitored inhibits must control the
isolation valve.
(2) Isolation valve opened prior to the payload reaching a safe
distance. When the isolation valve is opened prior to the
payload reaching a safe distance from the Orbiter, a minimum
of three independent electrical inhibits must prevent the
firing of any engine until the payload has reached a safe
distance from the Orbiter. The isolation valve must remain in
the closed condition during boost and entry and will be opened
only by flight crew comnand as a part of the final deployment
activities. Prior to opening the isolation valve, a minimum
of two remaining inhibits must be verified safe by flight or
ground crew monitoring and must remain available in real time
until final separation of the payload from the Orbiter. If
ground monitoring is used, continuous communication must be
available to inform the flight crew of the inhibit status.
When the liquid propulsion system cannot be returned to a safe
condition by crew command, single failure tolerant deployment
capability must be provided.
Deployment and/or separation. The premature deployment or separa-
tion of a payload, stage, appendage, or separable device to a
condition where it cannot withstand STS-induced loads (including
landing) or will prevent safe entry of the Orbiter is a catas-
trophic hazard. Three independent inhibits to the function must be
provided and must remain in the safe condition until performance of
the function does not present a hazard to the Orbiter or crew.
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These devices must he designed to preclude inadvertent mechanical
operation in the induced environments. If pyrotechnic devices are
employed, the initiators must meet the special pyrotechnic require-
ments in accordance with paragraph 210. Additional requirements
are a function of the planned payload operations as follows:
(1) Deployment/separation function performed after final separa-
tion of the payload from the O r b i t e r . W h e n the deploy-
ment/separation functions are planned to be performed after
final separation of the payload from the Orbiter, the func-
tions shall not be performed until the payload is at a safe
distance from the Orbiter. Monitoring of the status of two
inhibits must be available to the flight crew or ground in
near real time until final separation of the payload from the
Orbiter.
(2) Deployment/separation function performed before the final
separation of the payload from the Orbiter. When the deploy-
ment/separation functionsarepiannedto be performed before
the final separation of the payload from the Orbiter, the
three inhibits must remain in the safe condition for boost and
entry. Removal of the inhibits must be by crew command and
will be removed only in preparation for the planned deploy-
ment/separation activity. Conmand and monitoring of the
inhibits must be available to the flight crew for performance
of the function. The ability to return the inhibits to a safe
status must be available to the flight crew in the event the
function is not performed.\
d. Deployment/extension preventing payload bay door closure. If
during planned payload operations an element of the payload or any
payload support equipment violates the payload bay door envelope,
the hazard of preventing door closure must be controlled by inde-
pendent primary and backup 'methods, and this combination must be
two failure tolerant.
e. RF energy radiation. Cargo-produced radiated fields from payload
transmitter antenna systems in excess of levels defined for payload
bay door open operations in JSC 07700, Volume XIV, attachment I is
a catastrophic hazard. Three independent inhibits to radiation in
excess of these levels must be provided. There are no command and
monitoring requirements for the inhibits.
203 RETRIEVAL OF PAYLOADS. Deployable and freeflying payloads that are to be
retrieved shall have the capability to return hazardous systems to a safe
condition (i.e., meet the requirements of paragraphs 201 and 202). They
shall provide verification to the Orbiter or the ground that safing has been
accomplished prior to their retrieval and while still a safe distance from
the Orbiter^. Verification must establish that hazardous systems are at
least single failure tolerant.
204 HAZARD DETECTION AND SAFING. The need for hazard detection and safing by
the flight crew to control time-critical hazards shall be minimized and will
be implemented only when an alternate means of reduction or control of
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hazardous conditions is not. available. When implemented, these functions
shall be capable of being tested for proper operations during both ground
and flight phases.
205 CONTINGENCY RETURN OF PAYLOADS. Deployable payloads must provide the capa-
bility at all times prior to separation to safe the payload for contingency
return. This safing includes performing contingency operations to recon-
figure the payload to a safe condition for landing, and maintaining or
rpsafing inhibits of hazardous functions to meet requirements of paragraph
202.
206 FAILURE PROPAGATION. The design shall preclude propagation of failures from
the payload to the environment outside the payload.
207 REDUNDANCY SEPARATION. Safety-critical redundant subsystems shall be
arranged so that the probability of propagation of failure of one to the
other is minimized.
208 STRUCTURAL.
1. Structural Design. The structural design shall provide ultimate factors
of safety equal to or greater than 1.40 for all STS mission phases
except emergency landing. When failure of structure can result in a
catastrophic event, design shall be based on fracture control procedures
to prevent structural failure because of the initiation or propagation
of f laws or crack-like defects during fabrication testing and service
life.
2. Emergency Landing Loads. The structural design shall comply with the
ultimate design load factors for emergency landing loads that are
specified in JSC 07700, Volume XIV, attachment I.
3. Stress Corrosion. The selection of materials used in the design of
payload structures, support bracketry, and mounting hardware shall
comply with the stress corrosion requirements of MSFC-SPEC-522. For
those applications in which MSFC-SPEC-522 requires the submitta! of a
materials usage agreement, the data shall be submitted as a waiver
request in accordance with JSC 13830.
4. Pressure Vessels. Pressure vessels shall meet the ASME Poiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2, or MIL-STD-1522.
Where weight limitations prohibit meeting the above standards for flight
vessels, NSS/HP 1740.1 shall be used as the standard with an ultimate
safety factor of 1.5 or greater. Pressure vessels using MIL-STD-1522 or
NSS/HP 1740.1 shall also be qualification tested to demonstrate no
failure at the design burst pressure level. Pressure vessels using the
ASME Code or MIL-STD-1522 shall also be qualification tested to demon-
strate a life cycle capability of at least twice the maximum predicted
number of operating cycles. Particular attention shall be given to
insure compatibility of fluids used in cleaning, test, and operation
with pressure vessels.
5. Pressurized Lines and Fittings. Pressurized lines and fittings with
less than a 1.5-inch inside diameter shall have an ultimate factor of
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safety equal to or greater than 4.0. Those with a 1.5-inch or greater
inside diameter shall have an ultimate factor of safety equal to or
greater than 1.5. Other pressure system components not considered
pressure vessels, lines, and/or fittings shall have an ultimate factor
of safety equal to or greater than 2.5.
6. Decompression. Payloads located within manned pressurized volumes
designed to withstand decompression or subsequent repressurization shall
be capable of tolerating the differential pressure without resulting in
a hazard.
7. Sealed Containers. Sealed containers shall be analyzed to establish
hazardpotential. Containers with hazardous potential must be proof
tested to 1.5 times the nominal pressure differential.
209 MATERIALS. Materials test data for hazardous fluid compatibility, flamma-
bility, and offgassing are contained in JSC 02681. JSC 09604 contains a
listing of materials (both metals and nonmetals) with a "rating" indicating
acceptability for each material's characteristics. The payload material
requirements for hazardous materials, flanmability, and offgassing are as
follows:
1. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.
a. General. Hazardous materials shall not be released or ejected in or
near the Orbiter. Hazardous fluid systems must contain the fluids
after exposure to all STS environments unless the use of the Orbiter
vent/dump provisions have been negotiated with the STS operator.
Particular attention should be given to materials used in systems
containing hazardous fluids. These include gaseous oxygen, liquid
oxygen, propellants, oxidizers, and other fluids that could theo-
retically cause an exothermic reaction. Those materials within the
system exposed to oxygen (liquid and gaseous), both directly and by
a single failure, must meet the requirements of NHB 8060.1 for type
D materials at the maximum use temperature and pressure. Materials
within the system exposed to other hazardous fluids, both directly
and by a single failure, must pass the fluid compatibility require-
ments of NHB 8060.1 for type J materials at maximum use pressure and
temperature. The payload supplier's compatibility data on hazardous
fluids may be used to accept materials in this category if approved
by NASA.
b. Mercury. The use of mercury or its compounds shall be minimized.
Where used, the following information shall be documented prior to
NASA approval:
1) A list of equipment containing mercury to be used with justifi-
cation for each use.
2) The amount of mercury contained in the equipment.
3) How the equipment is protected to prevent release of the
mercury.
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4) A defined plan to accomplish decontamination if mercury is
released.
2. Orbiter Cabin Materials. Payload materials which are to be carried
within the Orbiter cabin must meet the requirements of NHB 8060.1,
"Flammability, Odor, and Offgassing Requirements and Test Procedures for
Materials in Environments that Support Combustion" and the requirements
of SE-R-0006, "General Spec i f icat ion, NASA JSC Requirements for
Materials and Processes" or an approved equivalent. Payload elements
carried in areas other than the Orbiter cabin are not required to meet
the requirements of NHB 8060.1.
3. Flammable Materials. In areas other than the Orbiter cabin, the
following good practices are required to be followed. Flammable
materials exposed to the ambient atmosphere shall be separated to pre-
vent flame propagation paths. Similarly, separation of flammable
materials from possible ignition sources is required to the maximum
extent practicable. Minimizing the use of flammable materials shall be
the preferred means of hazard reduction. Materials are considered
nonflammable or self-extinguishing if they meet the applicable flam-
mability test requirements of NHB 8060.1. Reference may also be made to
JSC 02681 for current flarmability test data and to JSC 09604 and JSC
11123 for materials selection lists and guidelines. For materials which
have no prior NASA flammability test data, the payload organization
shall present other flammability test results for NASA review or request
assistance from NASA in conducting applicable tests.
4. Material Qffgassing. Usage of materials which produce toxic offgassing
shall be avoided in habitable areas. Payload elements going into such
areas are required to be subjected to offgassing tests (black-box
levels) for safety validation prior to integration with STS elements.
Rigorous material selection and control to avoid unacceptable offgassing
is a negotiable alternative to black-box level testing. NHB 8060.1 or
an STS operator approved equivalent shall be used for the black-box
level offgassing test.
210 PYROTECHNICS.
1. General. All pyrotechnic subsystems and devices shall meet the design
and test requirements of MIL-STD-1512, "Electroexplosive subsystems,
electrically initiated, design requirements and test methods."
2. Catastrophic Hazards. Special safety requirements apply to pyrotechnic
initiators used for functions when premature firing is catastrophic. It
must be thoroughly demonstrated that such initiators are not susceptible
to premature firing from electrostatic discharge. These special
requirements do not apply where an S&A device provides a mechanical
interrupt of the pyrotechnic train immediately downstream of the
initiator and where the S&A device stays in the "SAFE" position until
after the payload has been deployed and reaches a safe distance from the
Orbiter. These requirements do apply, however, when an S&A device is
not provided or when an S&A device is provided but actuated to the "ARM"
position before deployment. These special requirements apply even
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thouqh multiple interlocks or inhibits are provided in the electrical
firing circuit in accordance with paragraph 202. The special require-
ments are given in paragraph 210-4.
3. NASA Standard Initiators. Due to concern about the electrostatic dis-
charge sensitivity of initiators used for functions such as described in
paragraph 210-2, NASA has developed NSI-type standard initiators (NASA
Standard Initiators) which fully comply with these special safety
requirements and which require no further demonstration. NSI-type
initiators are single bridgewire units with a ceramic insulating cup for
the explosive mix and a hermetically sealed spark gap protective feature
to bypass electrostatic discharges around (rather than through) the
explosive mix.
4. Transition Payloads. For payloads where the preliminary design has been
approved by the responsible payload organization, NSI-type initiators
are preferred for functions such as described in paragraph 210-2 and
require no further demonstration. Where this is not practicable or cost
effective, other initiators are acceptable if they meet the criteria and
demonstration requirements listed below:
a. Flight unit acceptance test. Each flight initiator must meet the
static discharge sensitivity test requirement of Method 205 of
MIL-STD-1512 without a resistor in the test firing circuit. Single
bridgewire initiators shall not be subjected to the pin-to-pin test.
The resistor of the MIL-STD has been specified to simulate the
impedance of human skin to electrostatic charge transfer when people
are the charge generators or carriers of concern. However, other
charge carriers are of concern for orbital space operations in the
payload bay, where there might be little or no transfer impedance
thus significantly affecting the voltage rise rate seen by the
initiator. All initiators must pass this acceptance test without
firing. The entire lot is to be rejected if there i s - a single
failure. However, if it can be shown that the failure is an
isolated case and that the failure mechanism is fully understood, a
waiver may be submitted for consideration.
b. Design configuration. Single bridgewire initiators are preferred.
Dual bridgewire initiators are inherently more sensit ive because
they negate the insulating advantage of the charge cup provided in
single bridgewire designs. If dual bridgewire initiators are used,
the paragraph 210-4a test applies between bridgewires as well as
bridgewire-to-case (three tests). It is preferred that the electro-
static protection feature be hermetically sealed to insure protec-
tion stability under all environments.
i
c. Design verification. If a hermetic seal is not used to provide
environmental stability, test or analysis must demonstrate that the
electrostatic discharge protection exists under all environments
including space vacuum. It is also required to demonstrate that the
above flight unit acceptance test does not degrade the protection
features of the unit under subsequent exposure to electrostatic
discharge or other phenomena which could cause premature firing.
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5. New Payloads. For new payloads in which preliminary design has not been
approved by the responsible payload organization, NSI-type initiators
should be used for functions such as deployment from the Orbiter, stage
separation, and SRM ignition, where premature firing is catastrophic.
Alternate equivalent initiator designs will be considered on a case-
by-case basis and will require approval by the STS.
6. Electrical Connection of Pyrotechnic Devices. Payloads with pyrotechnic
devices, which if prematurely fired may cause injury to people or damage
to property, shall be designed to be electrically connected in the
Orbiter and to have electrical interfaces verified before connecting the
pyrotechnic devices. Exceptions to this require specific approval of
the launch site safety office.
211 DESTRUCT SYSTEMS. Destruct systems will be used only when approved by the
STS operator and must comply with the requirements of paragraphs 202 and
204.
212 RADIATION.
1. Ionizing Radiation. All payloads containing or using radioactive mate-
rials or that generate ionizing radiation shall be identified and
approval obtained for their use. Descriptive data shall be provided in
accordance with JSC 13830. Major radioactive sources require approval
by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel through the NASA coordi-
nator for the panel. DOD payloads involving radioactive materials will
be processed through their own established procedures. Radioactive
materials shall comply with appropriate license requirements at the
planned launch and landing sites.
2. Nonionizing Radiation. Payloads shall not emit electromagnetic radia-
tion(including x-rays) which presents a hazard. Maximum acceptable
cargo-produced radiated fields are specified in JSC 07700, Volume XIV,
attachment I. The payload design shall be compatible with the payload
bay environment as specified in JSC 07700, Volume XIV, attachment I.
Transmitter antenna systems shall not be turned on during Orbiter ascent
and descent.
213 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS. Electrical power distribution circuitry shall be
designed so that faults internal to the payload do not damage STS circuitry
and do not create ignition sources for adjacent Orbiter or payload flammable
materials. Where lightning protection is required to avoid a catastrophic
hazard, document JSC 07636 shall be used as a guide for payload design.
214 VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. The safety aspect of any hazardous payload
safety-critical equipment shall be satisfactorily verified. Test, analysis,
and inspection are techniques for verification. The methods of verification
shall be documented, maintained, and submitted in support of the incremental
safety assessment reviews (paragraph 304).
215 HAZARDOUS PROCEDURES. Potentially hazardous operations shall be identified
and technical operating procedures shall be prepared, for assembly, test,
and use. Such procedures shall be verified to demonstrate control of the
hazard.
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216 REFLOWN HARDWARE. STS payloads and elements of STS payloads to be reflown
on another STS mission shall be reviewed for:
1. Correction of any safety deficiency encountered on previous missions.
2. Safety impact of any changes made to the hardware or operating
procedures.
3. Any maintenance and/or refurbishment affecting safety.
4. Appropriate design and verification features for reuse.
5. Safety of reuse in view of gradual wearout of the hardware or subtle
degradation (including fatigue) in previous use.
6. Any limited life items that may affect safety.
i
217 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY. Payload organizations who plan to use crew EVA for
payload operations shall comply with the design requirements of JSC 10615.
218 SERIES PAYLOADS. Subsequent payloads of a series that are 'intended to be
flown on the ST? will he reviewed for:
1. Safety impart of all changes to the subsequent payload including modi-
fications to the hardware and revisions to the payload operating
procedures.
2. Correction of any safety deficiency encountered on previous members of
the series.
3. Any limited life items that may affect safety.
219 FLAMMABLE ATMOSPHERES. During Orbiter entry, landing, and postlanding oper-
ations (whether planned or contingency), the normal payload functions shall
not cause ignition of a flammable payload bay atmosphere that may result
from leakage or ingestion of fluids into the payload bay.
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CHAPTER 3: SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
300 GENERAL. The following requirements are applicable to all payloads.
301 SAFETY ANALYSIS. A safety analysis shall be performed in a systematic
manner on each payload, its GSE, related software, and ground and flight
operations to identify hazardous subsystems and functions. The safety
analysis shall be initiated early in the design phase and shall be kept
current throughout the development phase. A safety assessment report which
documents the results of this analysis, including hazard identification,
classification, and resolution, and a record of all safety-related failures,
shall be prepared, maintained, and submitted in support of the safety
assessment reviews conducted by the STS operator in accordance with para-
graph 304. Detailed instructions for the safety analysis and safety assess-
ment reports are provided in JSC 13830.
HAZARD LEVELS. Hazards are classified according to potential as follows:
1. Critical Hazard. Results in damage to STS equipment, or the use of con-
tingency or emergency procedures.
2. Catastrophic Hazard. Results in the potential for personnel injury,
loss of the Orbiter, ground facilities, or STS equipment.
303 HAZARD REDUCTION. Action for reducing hazards shall be conducted in
the following order of precedence:
1. Design for Minimum Hazard. The major goal throughout the design phase
shall be to insure inherent safety through the selection of appropriate
design features. Damage control, containment, and isolation of poten-
tial hazards shall be included in design considerations.
2. Safety Devices. Hazards which cannot be eliminated through design
selection shall be reduced and made controllable through the use of
automatic safety devices as part of the system, subsystem, or equipment.
3. Warning Devices. When it is not practical to preclude the existence or
occurrence of known hazards or to use automatic safety devices, devices
shall be employed for the timely detection of the condition and the
generation of jn adequate warning signal, coupled with emergency con-
trols or corrective action, for operating personnel to safe or shut down
the affected subsystem. Warning signals and their application shall be
designed to minimize the probability of wrong signals or of improper
personnel reaction to the signal.
4. Special Procedures. Where it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of
an existing or potential hazard through design or the use of safety and
warning devices, special procedures shall be developed to counter
hazardous conditions for enhancement of personnel safety.
304 SAFETY ASSESSMENT REVIEWS. Safety assessment reviews will be conducted by
the STS flight operator (JSC) and the STS launch/landing site operator (KSC)
to determine compliance with the requirements of this document. An initial
contact meeting will be held at the earliest appropriate time and will be
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followed by formal review meetings spaced throughout the development of the
payload and its GSE. These meetings will be held at JSC and KSC. The
depth, number, and scheduling of reviews will be negotiated with the payload
organization and will be dependent on complexity, technical maturity, and
hazard potential. The safety review process must be completed, and the
certificate of payload safety compliance must be signed in accordance with
paragraph 305.1 prior to the installation of the payload in the Orbiter.
1. Data Submittal. Data shall be submitted prior to each meeting in sup-
port of these reviews. Data items shall include those necessary to
certify that all safety requirements have been satisfied. Waiver
requests and supporting rationale will normally be submitted at the time
the need is identified. In addition, data submittal items shall include
those specified in paragraph 305 applicable to the existent phase of the
program at the time of each review with other data as requested, includ-
ing safety-related design and operations data, schematics of hazardous
systems, and manufacturing assembly and handling procedures.
2. Concurrence and Approval. The basis for review concurrence and approval
w i l l b e documented in minutes issued jointly after each meeting; these
minutes will also list action items and open items. When a hazardous
system, associated operation, verification method, or related documenta-
tion is modified, approval becomes invalid and a new review and approval
are required. Detailed responsibilities, review procedures, and data
submittal requirements are given in JSC 13830.
305 SAFETY COMPLIANCE DATA. A safety compliance data package shall precede the
delivery of the payload to the launch site by 30 days and shall contain the
following items. The items marked with an asterisk shall be included in the
data package submitted for the phase III review.
1. A statement signed by the payload organization certifying the com-
pliance of the payload with the safety requirements of this document.
*2. A safety assessment report which documents the results of the paragraph
301 Safety Analysis, including hazard description, controls, and safety
verification methods (see JSC 13830).
*3. Approved waivers to safety requirements.
*4. A listing of radioactive materials in accordance with JSC 13830.
*5. A list which identifies and characterizes all RF transmitters and all
electromagnetic radiation which exceeds the limit for cargo-produced
radiated fields as specified in JSC 07700, Volume XIV, - attachment I.
In addition, the list shall include equipment capable of producing a
field strength more than 10 milliwatts per square centimeter for ground
safety purposes.
*6. A log book maintained on each pressure vessel/system showing pressuri-
zation history, fluid exposures and other pertinent data shall be
delivered with the payload. (For the phase III safety review, a
summary of the log book is sufficient.)
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*7. A summary of all safety-related failures or accidents related to pay-
load processing, test and checkout, including an assessment of their
potential impact to STS, elements of STS, and to ground safety,
together with action taken to prevent recurrence.
*8. Detailed technical operating procedures for launch and landing site
(including contingency sites) operations which are hazardous in nature.
There shall be step-by-step directions covering items such as personnel
access controls, emergency procedures, and weather restrictions.
*9. A list of all uses of mercury and its compounds in accordance with the
data requirements of paragraph 209-lb.
*10. A list of all pyrotechnic initiators installed or to be installed on
the payload, giving the function to be performed, the part number, the
lot number, and the serial number.
306 ACCIDENT/INCIDENT/MISSION FAILURES INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING. Acci-
dent/incident/mission failures investigation and reporting for NASA equip-
ment will be handled under the provisions of NMI 8621.1 and NHB 1700.1(VI).
For accident/incident/mission failures involving non-U.S. Air Force payloads
occurring after delivery to NASA facilities, investigation and reporting
will be in compliance with the above NASA documents. The payload orga-
nization and the individual payload element or experiment contractors will
cooperate fully with the investigation and provide any records, data, and
other administrative or technical support and services that may be deemed by
the STS operator to be pertinent. For U. S. Air Force payloads, the
"Air Force-NASA Agreement on Joint Space Program Accident Investigations"
will be the controlling document.
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT - An unplanned event which results in personnel fatality or
injury; damage to or loss of STS, environment, public property, or private prop-
erty; or could result in an unsafe situation or operational mode. An accident
refers to a major event, whereas an incident is a minor event or episode that
could lead to an accident.
ADIABATIC DETONATION - An observed phenomenon whereby the heat obtained by
compressing the vapors from fluids (e.g., hydrazine) is sufficient to initiate a
self-sustaining (explosive) decomposition. This compression may arise from
advancing liquid columns in sealed spacecraft systems.
ASE (Airborne Support Equipment) - See PSE.
CARGO - Everything contained in the Shuttle payload bay, plus other equipment
located elsewhere in the Orbiter which is payload unique and not carried in the
standard baseline Orbiter weight budget. This includes payloads and payload-
support equipment.
CATASTROPHIC HAZARD - See paragraph 302.
CERTIFICATE OF SAFETY COMPLIANCE - A formal documented approval of the safety
assessment effort. Includes a statement that all safety requirements of this
document have been met or, if not, what waivers are applicable.
CORRECTIVE ACTION - Action taken to preclude occurrence of an identified hazard
or to prevent recurrence of a problem.
CREDIBLE - A condition that can occur and is reasonably likely to occur. For the
purposes of this document, failures of structure, pressure vessels, and pressur-
ized lines and fittings are not considered credible failure modes if those
elements comply with the applicable requirements herein.
CRITICAL HAZARD - See paragraph 302.
EMERGENCY - Any condition which can result in crew injury or threat to life and
requires immediate corrective action, including predetermined crew response.
EVA - Extravehicular activity by the flight crew.
FAILURE - The inability of a system, subsystem, component or part to perform its
required function within specified limits, under specified conditions for a
specified duration.
FLIGHT CREW - Any personnel onboard the Space Shuttle engaged in flying the Space
Shuttleand/or managing resources onboard (e.g., commander, pilot, mission
specialist).
FLIGHT PERSONNEL - All personnel carried on the Space Shuttle vehicle including
flight crew, passengers, and payload specialists.
FREEFLYING PAYLOAD - A payload which is deployed and separated from the Orbiter.
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- Ground support equipment.
HAZARD - The presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe act or
condition.
HAZARD DETECTION - An alarm system used to alert the crew to an actual 'or
impending hazardous situation for which the crew is required to take corrective
or protective action.
INDEPENDENT INHIBIT - Two or more inhibits are independent if a single event or
environment cannot eliminate more than one inhibit, and all inhibits cannot be
removed by the same type of event or environment.
INHIBIT - A design feature that prevents operation of a function.
JSC - Johnson Space Center, NASA, Houston, Texas 77058.
KSC - Kennedy 'Space Center, NASA, Florida 32899.
MANNED PRESSURIZED VOLUME - Any module in which a person can enter and perform
activities in a shirt-sleeve environment.
MONITOR - Ascertain the safety status of payload functions, devices, inhibits,
parameters, etc.
NEAR REAL TIME - Available to the crew within one earth orbit.
NORMAL STS MISSION PHASES - All portions of the mission to be performed by the
STS, excluding STS abort and emergency landing.
NSI - NASA standard initiator (pyrotechnic).
NSI-TYPE - NSI configuration pyrotechnic initiators from specific lots which have
been predetermined to be acceptable to NASA from a. safety standpoint.
OFFOASSING - The emanation of volatile matter of any kind from materials into a
manned pressurized volume.
PAYLOAD - Any equipment or material carried by the STS that is not considered
part of the basic STS itself. It, therefore, includes items such as freeflying
automated spacecraft, individual experiments or instruments, PSE,' etc. As used
in this document, the term payload also includes payload-provided GSE and systems
and flight and ground systems software.
PAYLOAD BAY (OR CARGO RAY) - The 15-foot diameter by 60-foot long enclosed volume
within the Orbiter, designed to carry carriers, payloads, payload-support equip-
ment, and associated mounting hardware.
PAYLOAD ELEMENTS - Experiments, instruments, or other individual payload items
which are subsets of an integrated, multipayload cargo complement on missions
such as Spacelab, Long Duration Exposure Facility, etc.
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PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION - The funding or sponsoring organization for the experiment,
Dayload, or mission. This does not mean the principal investigator, payload
contractor, designer, or developer except to the extent delegated by the spon-
soring organization. For NASA payloads, a NASA Headquarters payload program
office is the sponsoring organization and usually delegates to a NASA Field
Center the authority for formal interface with the STS operator in the implemen-
tation of this document. Other payload organizations include, but are not
limited to, the following: DOD, other U. S. Government agencies, non-U.S.
Government, public organizations, private persons or private organizations, inter-
national organizations, European Space Agency, foreign governments, et,c.
PERSONNEL INJURY - With respect to catastrophic hazard levels for STS payloads,
personnel injury shall be limited to loss of life or major injury which results
in the incapacitation of the crew (e.g., hone fractures, second or third degree
burns, severe lacerations, internal injury, severe radiation exposure, uncon-
sciousness, etc.).
PRESSURE VESSEL - A container that stores pressurized fluids and:
(1) Contains stored energy of 14,240 foot-pounds (19,310 joules) or greater
based on adiabatic expansion of a perfect gas; or
(2) Contains a gas or liquid which will create a hazard if released; or
(3) Will experience a design limit pressure greater than 100 psi.
PSE (Payload-Support Equipment) - The flight equipment and systems needed to
support the payload such as caution and warning, data recording, controlled
functions, instrumentation, payload cradles, etc.
REAL TIME - Available to the crew upon demand.
RISK - The chance (qualitative) of personnel injury or fatality, damage to or
loss of equipment or property.
SAFE DISTANCE - The distance that must be obtained between the Orbiter and a
freeflying payload to permit performance of a function without presenting a
hazard to the Orbiter and/or crew.
SAFETY - Freedom from chance of personnel injury or fatality, and damage to or
loss of equipment or property.
SAFETY ANALYSIS - The technique used to systematically identify, evaluate, and
resolve hazards.
SAFETY CRITICAL - Containing an element of risk.
SAFING - (1) Action to retreat from an armed condition.
(2) Actions which eliminate or control hazards.
SEALED CONTAINER - A housing or enclosure designed to retain its internal
atmosphere and which does not meet the pressure vessel definition (e.g., an
electronics housing).
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SPACE SHUTTLE - The Orbiter, solid rocket boosters, and external tank.
STS (Space Transportation System) - The Space Shuttle, Spacelab, IUS (inertial
upper stage), and the ground sites needed to support these elements.
STS ABORT - An abort of the STS mission wherein flight personnel, payload, and
vehicle are returned to a landing site.
STS OPERATOR - The NASA Headquarters/STS Operations Directorate is the STS opera-
tor.NASA/JSC is the STS flight operator and is responsible for the safety of
payload flight systems and flight operations. NASA/KSC is the STS launch/landing
site operator and is responsible for the safety of payload GSE and ground opera-
tions. The'JSC STS Operations Program Office is the primary point of contact for
formal interface between the STS operator and the payload organization in the
implementation of this document. JSC accomplishes this with the participation
and concurrence of KSC. Further delineation of STS implementation roles and
responsibilites is given in JSC 13830.
USER - See "PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION."
WAIVER - Granted use or acceptance of an article which does not meet the speci-
fied requirements.
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APPENDIX B: APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following documents form a part of this document to the extent specified
herein. In the event of conflict between the reference documents and the con-
tents of this document, the contents of this document shall be considered super-
seding requirements. Copies of these documents can be obtained from Code JM61,
Johnson Space Center, NASA, Houston, Texas 77058.
DOCUMENT NUMBERS AND TITLES REFERENCED IN PARAGRAPH
KSC-K-STSM-14.1, "Launch Site Accommodations 101
Handbook for STS Payloads"
JSC 11123, "STS Payload Safety Guidelines 103-1, 209-3
Handbook"
JSC 13830, "Implementation Procedure for STS 103-2, 200, 208-3, 212-1,
Payloads System Safety Requirements" 301, 304-2, 305-2, 305-4
JSC 07700, Volume XIV, Attachment I, "Shuttle 208-2, 212-2, 305-5
Orbiter/Cargo Standard Interfaces" 202-2e
MSFC-SPEC-522, "Design Criteria for Controlling 208-3
Stress Corrosion Cracking"
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 208-4
VIII, Divisions 1 and 2
MIL-STD-1522, "Standard General Requirement for 208-4
Safe Design and Operation of Pressurized Missile
and Space Systems"
NSS/HP-1740.1, "NASA Aerospace Pressure Vessel • 208-4
Safety Standard"
JSC 09604, "JSC Government-Furnished Equipment 209, 209-3
Materials Selection List and Materials Documen-
tation Procedures"
JSC 02681, "Nonmetallic Materials Design Guide- 209, 209-3
lines and Test Data Handbook"
NHB 8060.1, "Flammability, Odor, and Offgassing 209-1 209-2, 209-3,
Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in 209-4
Environments That Support Combustion"
SE-R-0006, "NASA JSC Requirements for Materials 209-2
and Processes"
MIL-STD-1512, "Electroexplosive Subsystems, Elec- 210, 210-4a
trically Initiated, Design Requirements, and
Test Methods"
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JSf 07636, "Space Shuttle Program Lightning 213
Protection Criteria Document"
JSC 10615, "Shuttle EVA Description and Design 217
Criteria"
NMI 8621.1, "Policy Directive Accident/Incident/ 306
Mission Failures investigation and Reporting"
N'R 1700.1 (VI), "NASA Safety Manual" 306
"Air Force-NASA Agreement on Joint Space Program 306
Accident Investigations"
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